JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
of these writers to demonstrate why his choice was the best. In the Germanic tradition, "culture is our whole body of technical equipment" (Small 1905:59) . For Lester Ward, "a culture is a social structure" (1907:235). To Wissler, "a culture is a definite association complex of ideas " (1916b:197) . "Culture," according to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, "is part, though only part, of the personality" (1952:114) . This is a truly extraordinary situation. We are reminded of the parable of the blind men and the elephant, since from a holistic point of view we would have to sum up these various partial definitions to arrive at a proper, adequate, complete definition of culture.
It is quite obvious from the literature that, of all these partial views of culture, the most popular-increasingly so-is the restriction of culture to mentalistic phenomena, to ideas or the like in the minds of men. This, in combination with the established concept of the powerful and uni-directional influence of culture on whatever it relates to, has produced the crassest form of idealism as the reigning philosophy in anthropology. A simple demonstration of the inadequacy of anthropology's current philosophy can be made with reference to artifacts, or material culture. In idealistic terms, material culture is a misnomer, and artifacts are simply the products of ideas, or of something more vague but still mentalistic. "In a strict sense, according to our definition of culture as a set of patterns and themes for the guidance of human behavior, material culture is of course not a part of culture at all but only a result or product of it" (Beals and Piddington 1957:521-522) . This is all we are told, and such authors as these presumably are satisfied with the formulation thus presented. As Kroeber and Kluckhohn noted, however, such authors are operating with an "unnecessarily restricted" concept of culture: "Ideas alone, in the strict sense, seem a narrow concept for embracing the whole of culture" (1952:67) .
More than this, are there no reciprocal effects of artifacts on ideas? Indeed, are not artifacts capable of generating ideas ab initio? How many of our ideas or notions are the result of the artifacts of production and consumption with which we are surrounded? Are not "patterns and themes," at least in certain cases or to a certain extent, the "result or product" of material culture? As expressed by the archetypal materialist-and realist-of our era, in his here appropriately entitled Poverty of Philosophy: "In acquiring new productive forces [i.e., artifacts of production] men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production..., they change all their social relations... The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with their material productivity, produce also principles, ideas and categories, in conformity with their social relations" (Marx 1956:105) . Certainly motor habits are the product of familiarity with artifacts. "The hands, arms, legs and eyes are adjusted by the use of implements to the proper technical skill necessary in a culture" (Malinowski 1931:622; my italics). There is no doubt that material culture has an effect on mental culture-and the same can be said for the relationship between behavioral culture ("human behavior") and mental culture. It will not do, however, to say that it is material culture alone that is culture, or behavioral culture alone that is culture, any more than it has been intelligible to take mental culture alone as culture. Marx was definitely moving in the direction of seeing a total system, the various parts of which affect each other. That is the path we also must follow, to make sense out of the existing anthropological literature and to be able to formulate coherent thoughts and meaningful problems for investigation.
In recent years, we have witnessed the rise of a "New Physical Anthropology," even of a "New Archaeology." But ethnology the core of cultural anthropology, and the source of most anthropological theory-has been in the doldrums. The reason, perhaps, is because we have taken a series of wrong turns in the history of ethnological theory, ending in a cul de sac from which no movement is possible except by retracing our steps. Here an attempt will be made to do just that, as we move back through the literature and then forward on the basis of Bierstadt's early, crude formulation of a culture as a total system (1938) , of the general tendency in Malinowski's work to conceptualize such total cultural systems (see Leach 1961:6) , and of the hints and intimations in the writings of many anthropologists that, unconsciously, they were indeed thinking in like terms.
It will be the thesis of this paper that there are certain total systems which deserve to be called cultural systems. There are, to be sure, those who recognize the existence of such total systems who nevertheless prefer to limit "culture" to only a part of that totality. They either do not name these total systems or, on the assumption that society and culture are mutually exclusive within such systems, refer to them as "sociocultural" systems. The term sociocultural, widely used in the anthropological literature, is a bastard term, a two-headed calf. It suggests that the total systems which we are considering have a dual reality, a schizophrenic existence, being both social and cultural. Let us recognize that the members of human societies are caught up in total cultural systems, as components thereof, just as molecules may be caught up in organic systems (organisms) as components thereof. If it is absurdly redundant, as it surely is, to speak of an organism as a moleculo-organic system, it is equally absurd and redundant to speak of a culture as a socio-cultural system. If "socio" refers to social organization, there should be even less resistance to recognizing that it signifies a part of culture and should be discarded as totally superfluous and confusing. For those with a mentalistic concept of culture, and the usual view of society, the term sociocultural continues to exclude material culture, consequently does not refer to the entire system, and so fails to accomplish its purpose. Thus, for Linton, there is a "social-cultural" reality, but material culture remains part of the "physical environment" (1938a:436, 432 ).
We are all by now too sophisticated to believe that our problem is simply to define a term. What we are confronted with is the reality with which our discipline is concerned, and the need to develop a suitable vocabulary to discuss that reality, a vocabulary that fits. If we postulate that there are natural boundaries in the real world, natural planes of cleavage, a suitable vocabulary is one whose terms refer to distinguishable entities in reality thus divided. We can presume that first attempts will be crude, early definitions of terms rough and imprecise. Refinement will involve either expanding the meaning of a roughly defined or conceived term to the boundaries of the real entity which encompasses it or reducing that meaning to the boundaries of a real entity it contains. Definitions and discussions of culture thus far have left it somewhere between culture-as-ideas and culture-as-total-system, which means we can either contract or expand its meaning to those respective boundaries. If we choose to contract, we must forever renounce the understanding that culture is extremely powerful, is a sufficient explanation for human behavior, is a system (or, more precisely, takes the form of systems) in its own right, and is all that a cultural anthropologist need study (aside from the natural environment) to handle the traditional questions and issues of his field. We are further left without a name for our entire field of interest. If we choose to expand, these difficulties disappear, and we are led to the argument that follows.
THE PROBLEM
There is a long-standing problem or predicament in anthropology that has lingered on to the present day. Despite a great deal of attention and many treatises on the subject both short and long, anthropology's key concept remains somehow unsatisfying in the way it is generally comprehended and discussed within the discipline. A number of years ago, Kroeber wrote pridefully as follows: "The most significant accomplishment of anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century has been the extension and clarification of the concept of culture" (1952:139 ). Yet, in the same volume in which that passage appeared, Kroeber was forced to acknowledge, "We seem not yet to have attained a concise, unambiguous, inclusive, and exclusive definition of culture" (1952: 23, see also vii; Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952:4) .
It might seem odd that Kroeber felt a definitional inadequacy. Tylor's classic definition of culture as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (1871:1), is certainly concise and clear. Tylor's definition of the word culture, the first explicit definition of the term in its anthropological sense, has never been rendered entirely obsolete. It has, indeed, been the touchstone for all subsequent considerations of the concept in anthropology. Furthermore, it established with one stroke what Tylor himself called the science of culture, the interest that came to be known as cultural anthropology.
Yet a feeling of dissatisfaction with Tylor's formulation, a sense that it is deficient in one or more ways, is evidenced not only by the passages noted in Kroeber's writings, but also in the continuing efforts by anthropologists to define the term anew. In their masterful study of the subject, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) compiled 167 and more definitions of the word culture by different authors, no two of which were alike. As one earlier observer noted, "Tylor's definition of culture is ... generally accepted 'in principle,' but in practice varying widely from interpreter to interpreter. To put it rather bluntly, the scientists studying culture are not agreed among themselves, except in a vague sort of way, as to the nature of the data they are studying" (Gary 1929 :174; see also Bidney 1944:30, 32). A hundred years have passed since Tylor's definition was first published and a science of culture established. The time is surely propitious for an awakened realization that, after all these years, there still remains an inadequate understanding and a lack of consensus about anthropology's most important concept.
"We anthropologists," wrote Stewart, are "the discoverers of culture" (1964: 442; see also Ellwood 1927b:12-13). Beals and Hoijer (1965:19) spoke for anthropologists generally when they identified "the development of the concept of culture" as one of the two "major contributions of anthropology to the social sciences," the other being "the emphasis upon each culture as an integrated whole," about which we shall have more to say in an appropriate place. The anthropologist's concept of culture had a powerful impact upon sociologists earlier in this century, producing "a rapidly increasing school of 'cultural sociologists,' who realize that the proper study of sociology is culture" (Murdock 1932:210) . "The cultural perspective," remarked Dollard, "is one of the few real achievements of social science" (1939:53n.). Ellwood wrote of "the revolutionary importance of 'the culture concept' for the understanding of human social phenomena" (1927b:15). According to Bidney, "The basic concept of contemporary social science is undoubtedly that of culture" (1947:375). Within anthropology, the concept continues to be highly and widely regarded; in Kluckhohn's words, "culture remains the master concept of American anthropology" (1951:86) . A recent textbook to which thirty-four anthropologists contributed informs students that culture is "the single most important concept in anthropological theory" (Anon. 1971:37). Yet such vagueness has always attached to the term-Boas himself wrote of "the vague term 'culture' " (1938a: (1957: 53, see also 103). As a hard-headed realist, Radcliffe-Brown could not be blamed for his position, given the sorry condition of thinking about culture in his day. At present the word is used in simplistic expositions of why different peoples behave differently, etc., but it seems to have lost generative power.
A highly significant trend in recent years has been the replacement of the terms cultural anthropology and cultural anthropologist by the terms social anthropology and social anthropologist. The shifting of focus thus indicated away from the concept of culture could prove to be the most damaging event in the history of anthropological theory. This shift might be explained in part by the destruction of the strong Boasian tradition of cultural anthropology in this country under the fierce and unjustified attacks of its detractors. The effect of these attacks has been to facilitate the triumph of RadcliffeBrown's advocacy of a "social anthropology" or "comparative sociology" (1952:2, 1958 :55, 128, 141) that would relegate the concept of culture to a subordinate if not minor theoretical role. The seriousness of this trend was recently emphasized by Harris (1970:59) .
The point of view regarding the concept of culture held by those who identify themselves as social anthropologists, and who find it congenial to think of their discipline as social anthropology, is fairly established (see Murdock 1951:467, 471-472; Firth 1951:477) . Perhaps more starkly revealing than the tenor of Radcliffe-Brown's own writing is the following passage by another of the British social anthropologists, with reference (surprisingly) to economics, material culture, and mythology: "These came to be subsumed under the title 'culture,' a word which has often been used in the post-war years almost in a pejorative sense to describe a sort of rag-bag of odds and ends in which to thrust all facts and ideas in which the social anthropologist was not at the moment interested" (Richards 1957:29 The following points will be contended in this paper: (1) A comparative sociology would not be adequate to handle the full range of problems traditionally treated by the cultural anthropologist. (2) The concept of culture can be made very clear and precise, and demonstrably conforming to a definite empirical reality. (3) A set of terms incorporating the word "culture" can be given such exact definition as to dispel vagueness in a thoroughgoing fashion, these including the terms "culture," "a cultural phenomenon," "a cultural trait," "a cultural feature," and "a cultural system." With these and a number of auxiliary terms, it should prove possible to generate some very compelling theory and the promise of much more to come.
ANTHROPOLOGY AND CULTURE
The term anthropology, in its strict etymological sense, means the study of man. This, however, is generally recognized to be an inadequate definition if only because the word man conjures up the picture of man the biological being, the organism, alone. As a consequence, some anthropologists have looked with favor on a definition of anthropology as the study of man and his works, a phrase that was used as the title of an outstanding textbook by Herskovits (1948;  see also Kroeber 1923: 1; Linton 1938b:241; Gillin 1939:45-46 ). This definition--"the study of man and his works"-is a decided improvement, since it makes explicit what anthropologists do study. It is deficient in that it suggests a dual subject matter, as if a single discipline were dedicated to two mutually exclusive fields of study.
A satisfactory definition of the term by which we designate the anthropological science, one which specifies the full range of its interests while at the same time stressing its unitary and unified character, can be derived from proper definitions of the terms "phenomenon" and "human phenomenon." We may define a "phenomenon" as any particular observable thing, action or property in the physical universe. We may define a "human phenomenon" as any phenomenon (thus defined) owing its existence to the mere existence of man. Human phenomena, then, would include all biological and all nonbiological phenomena generated by the existence of man (the genusHomo) with his peculiar characteristics. Anthropology can now be defined as the study of the sum total of all human phenomena, everywhere across the face of this planet and beyond, and through all time since the first emergence of Homo some two million years ago or so.
Only at this juncture, as a second step, does it become appropriate to recognize the inherent duality of anthropology. The total field of human phenomena with which anthropology is concerned does prove to be divisible naturally into two subfields, those that have been the traditional investigatory areas of physical anthropology and cultural anthropology respectively. The subfield that is the specific concern of physical anthropology may be delimited as the sum total of all [ 75, 1973 human genetic phenomena. Here we may define a "human genetic phenomenon" as any phenomenon that is the direct expression of genetic inheritance in man. Physical anthropology is, for all intents and purposes, human biology-the specialized biological concern with a single genus, our own. The other subfield consists of what remains-the sum total of all human nongenetic phenomena. A "human nongenetic phenomenon" may be defined as any phenomenon that is not the direct expression of genetic inheritance in man. Anthropology has the distinction of being the discipline which first recognized the existence of this second subfield and the vastness of its range. This is culture, the province of study for cultural anthropology. "Culture," then, may be defined as our generic term for all human nongenetic, or metabiological, phenomena. It should be noted that this definition corresponds precisely to the general understanding of the term in anthropology, though different articulations may vary in their phraseology and inclusiveness. Since "nongenetic" suggests, unnecessarily, a negative or residual category, one may prefer the use of "metabiological." This latter term indicates in a positive way that culture is not itself biological but is something that biology (in the form of the genus Homo) has generated. In thus defining culture we have not moved, except in precision of expression, from Kroeber's concept of the "superorganic," of the "purely civilizational and non-organic" (1952: Let us define a "society" as a group of organisms of the same species forming a breeding population. This appears to be the central idea of the concept as used by biologists: they recognize that many species are divided into breeding populations each of which is a society of organisms of that species. For the human species, however, because of its distinctive cultural dimension, an alternative second criterion must be added. A "human society" may be defined as a group of human organisms forming a breeding population or a maximum political entity, whichever is larger in the particular instance (Weiss 1969:42) . For any nonhuman species, then, SN = P (a population may be taken as a society of that species). For the human species alone, SH = nP (where n is an integer, such that n 2 1; n stands for the number of populations existing under the same political authority in a given case).
The issue relevant to our present discussion is whether we are justified in limiting our concept of (human) society to a group of human beings satisfying certain conditions. The position is taken here that the restricted definition provided above is the only legitimate and usable one for a proper handling of the human situation. Further, it conforms to the definition of (human) society accepted by sociologists and many anthropologists. As Simmel phrased it, "society merely is the name for a number of individuals, connected by interaction" (1950: What additional terminology is needed becomes apparent when we consider the manner in which the concept of a system is relevant to our discussion at this point. The term system has been much used and much abused in recent years, but for our purposes we need to take it in its long-established sense where we would speak of an atom, a molecule, or an organism as a system. A good definition is provided by RadcliffeBrown: "a set of entities in such relation to one another as to make a naturally cohering unity" (1957:20) . An acquaintance with reality should suffice to convince us that a human society, despite the common use of the phrase "social system," is never a complete system in itself. It always forms part of a larger, pragmatically complete system. This larger system is "pragmatically complete" in that it is self-contained, having within it all that is needed for its operation as a system exploiting its environment. The composition of and proper nomenclature for this distinctive type of system may be indicated briefly.
Every human society creates, uses, and lives in intimate association with a body of nonhuman things of human manufacture, the artifacts or material culture pertaining to that society. The relationship between a human society and its artifacts is as intimate as that existing among the members of the society itself, and also as significant and reciprocal. There is no human society without an associated material culture. The two are in mutual dependence: such artifacts can only be made by human agency, and human beings individually and collectively come to depend on artifacts for their survival and manner of living. The members of a given human society plus the artifacts they produce form a set of components that in every case proves to be (1) organized, and (2) individually modified to fit properly within the organization of what we can recognize as a complete or total system. This total system may be called with no inconsistency "a culture" or "a cultural system"-terms which may be used interchangeably.
A cultural system, then, consists of (1) a set of material components that includes (a) a set of human components (the members of the human society) and (b) a set of nonhuman components (the artifacts comprising the material culture); (2) an organizational network of interrelationships and interactions binding together (or linking) the material components of the system, both human and nonhuman; (3) a set of modifications imposed by the operation of the system upon the material components, adapting them to function properly-to look and act as they should-within the system, this set of modifications being divisible into (a) a set of physical modifications (changes in form or chemistry) imposed mainly on the nonhuman components of the system, and (b) a set of neural modifications (language, ideas, attitudes, skills) imposed mainly on the human components (Weiss 1969 The view presented here is that both these alternatives are unsatisfactory: society and culture are not to be taken either as equivalent or as mutually exclusive. Instead, the relationship between them which makes best sense is of a third kind. Society (here referring specifically to human society) and culture are indeed distinct, but they are distinct in that one is more extensive and includes the other. By our definitions, each cultural system contains within it one (and only one) human society; the sum total of all cultural phenomena includes within it all human social phenomena. Kroeber once wrote that "no anthropologist would concede for a moment that social, economic, or political structure and functioning were something outside the totality of what he considers culture," yet he spoke of "one of the more obscure or confused questions: how social structure can be equally 'social' and 'cultural,' while no one would make such a claim for religion or art" (1952:154, 152). The difficulty Kroeber saw is resolved at once with the simple solution offered here: the cultural contains all that is humanly social plus all other human nongenetic phenomena. This solution has one further advantage: in many contexts, "society" and "culture" can indeed be used interchangeably, as when we speak of a human being as a member of a society or of a culture. We need only retain the awareness that such interchangeability is the consequence, not of the terms being equivalent, but rather of the one being a part of the other. In other contexts, the two terms would not be interchangeable since, for example, an artifact would be a part of a culture but not of a society. As Radcliffe-Brown once noted, artifacts "are part of a traditional system (i.e., what we call a culture system...)" (1957:53 . "Anthropologists," according to Kroeber and Parsons, "are... given to being holistic and therefore often begin with total systems of culture and then proceed to subsume social structure as merely a part of culture" (1958: 582, see also 583). These authors, in a move that could only please the sociologically oriented by downgrading or trivializing the culture concept, proposed that "culture" be defined "more narrowly" as excluding social organization (1958:583; see also Parsons 1957:56). Gastil has suggested that this move, which "seems currently accepted by many anthropologists," also "seems neither very objective
[n]or productive" (1961:1281, 1284). Nor was the proposal a novel one: Malinowski noted critically years earlier, "Social organization is often regarded by sociologists as remaining outside culture" (1931:622).
With the understandings thus far set forth, it becomes quite clear what the limits of the concept of society are and how the concept of culture permits us to go beyond those limits to deal with all the problems traditional to anthropology. These problems include what Gumplowicz clearly recognized to be "subjects which decidedly do not belong to sociology, such as the development of implements, the spread of domesticated animals, the influence of the use of metals, and the like" (quoted in Lippert 1931:x-xi). These very subjects, falling outside the study of society per se, have a significance and interest in themselves equal to that of any strictly sociological concern; they have a significance and relevance of the highest order for questions of social change and development; and they are major areas of interest in cultural anthropology (but not in sociology) from its beginnings a century ago. Clearly, a focus on society rather than on the more ample concept of culture is restrictive and inhibiting even in the consideration of strictly sociological questions, which so frequently require us to explore what An unusual characteristic of this presentation is that culture emerges as the master term and concept that subsumes not only all human social phenomena but also human beings themselves as members of the human societies incorporated into their respective cultural systems. To call a human being a component of a cultural system-and so an element of culture, a cultural phenomenon -should prove shocking to those for whom human beings only "have" or "carry" culture. Yet by implication this idea has long been accepted in anthropology. What other interpretation can be given to the following statements gleaned from the writings of so many eminent anthropologists, what interpretation other than that human beings are to be taken as parts of the cultures to which they pertain? "We must understand the individual as living in his culture," wrote Boas (1959:xvi), who also used the phrase "the culture in which he lives" in the same sense as "the society in which he lives" (1962:14-15 There is every indication that it will be productive to consider each and every human being as a cultural phenomenon as well as a cultural product-born into a given cultural system and shaped by that system. Although they retain their status as biological entities, all human beings are caught up in cultural systems and so take on the added status of cultural components. Everything biological in man, including whatever genetically-established drives and propensities he may have, can be expected to undergo a subtle change-a "sea-change" -through enculturation to become, in an important sense, cultural. As Judd noted, "inherited traits are modified and in some cases wholly transformed by the demands of society" (1926:1). We may recognize eating as a definitely biological matter in man as in all other organisms but, in the case of man, when, where, what, how often, etc., are all regulated or set by the cultural system. Coughing is without question a biological characteristic of man, but there will be cultural standards regarding the manner in which coughing may be expressed (whether it should be covered or stifled under certain circumstances, for example-or allowed fullest expression, as at a concert). There is the predominantly cultural cough of the sort that Bernard Shaw called the "modest cough of the minor poet." Similarly, laughter is a biological trait of mankind, but whether, for example, it will be the "ha, ha, ha" of English-speakers or the "ja, ja, ja" of Spanish-speakers will depend on which language is spoken in the culture (compare Winston 1933:192-194 With these illustrations, we can see in new perspective the relationship between physi-cal anthropology and cultural anthropology. For man, the genetic is subsumed under the nongenetic. Physical anthropology thus appears as a part of cultural anthropology, that part which treats of the biological characteristics of the human components of cultural systems. On the model of biochemistry (the study of molecular structure and behavior within organic systems), physical anthropology might be given the alternative designation "culturobiology."
HUMANNESS AND CULTURE
Let us pause at this point in the argument to consider how well the elements of Tylor's definition enter into the present formulation. Tylor described culture as a "complex whole," that is, as a system-a total, unified, integrated, holistic system of a sort which can be called "a culture" or "a cultural system." He then proceeded to list examples of what he was referring to-"knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom"-all of which have one characteristic in common: they are nongenetic. The list is explicitly left open ended to include all other kinds of nongenetic phenomena ("capabilities and habits" in the widest sense). The restriction which Tylor does place on the concept of culture is that it be limited to mankind in its application, that it be reserved for what is "acquired by man." By anthropology's most authoritative definition, then, culture is something exclusively human and found in association with no other species. Tylor thus intended culture to be taken as the sum total of all human nongenetic phenomena, which can be recognized as the generic definition of "culture" set forth in this paper. Finally, Tylor recognized that culture is generated by "man as a member of society," conforming to our understanding that a human society necessarily forms the nucleus of every cultural system. Without human beings there could be no culture and no cultural systems, by definition, and without the social nature of human beings ensuring that they will always be found in societal groups, cultural systems could not be maintained for lack of continuity from one generation to the next. "It is hardly conceivable that a non-social animal could develop culture" (Gower 1937: 358; see also Malinowski 1939:956 In the misapplication of the word culture by nonanthropologists, we witness a curious example of the transformation of a word's meaning outside the discipline where it originated, to the point where it is unrecognizable. The steps in this transformation might be traced as follows: Tylor was attempting to define "culture" as "all human nongenetic phenomena." This came to be comprehended as "all human learned behavior" even though human learned behavior is only part of culture thus defined and is part of culture not because it is learned but because it is human (compare Ellwood 1927b:16). The "human" dropped out, leaving "learned behavior" which, it was soon recognized, is found among many animals besides man. We have arrived at the point where "culture" is defined as "animal learned behavior." There is no reason to presume, however, that the transmutation will end here. The conclusion of the "logical" process can be predicted. The "learned" will drop out, leaving "animal behavior," the most characteristic form of which, for (nonhuman) animals, is instinctive. "Culture" will come to mean "instinctive behavior," the very antithesis of its original anthropological significance. This final step has already been taken by the camp followers of science: Ardrey speaks of "cultural instinct" and "that truism of zoology, the capacity of a species to include in its genetic make-up cultural attitudes" ( What are the relevant characteristics of language? Language is a code (Saussure 1959:14) . Like the genetic code which transmits genetic information from one generation to the next in a society, the linguistic code is the primary mechanism by which mankind transmits nongenetic information from one generation to the next. Language serves to transmit and to maintain the corporate heritage without which a cultural system would collapse. The propensity for language-the ability to create, learn and use language-is biologically given in the human genus as its most distinguishing characteristic. But any particular language is nongenetic (not genetically inherited), hence cultural. Language is thus part of culture, yet is unique in that it ensures the existence and maintenance of all of culture. As Warden noted, "It seems altogether unlikely that a culture could emerge and maintain itself without the support of a well-developed capacity for vocal language" (1936:22). This understanding was expressed even more forcibly by other writers, such as Ellwood-"Verbal language, we have every reason to believe, is the first element of culture, and becomes the main vehicle of the cultural process" (1927a:12-13, see also Language is a form of animal communication, a form restricted to a single animal genus, Homo. Empirically there can be no question but that language is a powerful means of communicating nongenetic information, as powerful and reliable as the genetic mechanism is for transmitting genetic information and far more powerful than the cries and gestures used for communication elsewhere in the organic realm. Language proves sufficiently powerful to carry the burden of any culture's corporate heritage down through the generations. Its absence in the nonhuman world would appear to account for the sporadic nature there of whatever learned behavior there may be. Such nonhuman learned behavior (nongenetic phenomena) rarely survives a single transmission for lack of a suitably powerful means of transmitting and so maintaining that information (see Ellwood 1927a:4-5; Murdock 1932:212). This situation was transformed by the introduction of language, the advent of which some two million years ago (presumably) ushered in both man (the genus Homo) and culture. If it be argued that it is not proper to use any but some physical criterion or criteria to distinguish a genus, we may suggest that the advent of language must have marked some change in the structure of the brain to produce the linguistic faculty (compare Kroeber 1948:225) . In this last regard, the present author favors the position taken by Linton: "Language is so necessary to the existence of human life as we know it that it seems probable that it developed at the same time, if not before, such first steps in the human direction as the use of tools and fire" (1936:81).
In any event, language is so much more flexible and self-generative than all forms of nonhuman animal communication that it stands apart from them. Mankind has come to rely on language as much as on the genetic mechanism for the maintenance of its existence. It is possible that certain information transmitted by the genetic code in other species has come to be transmitted by the linguistic code in human societies, so that if divested of language human beings might prove to be incapable of surviving even biologically. It is definite that the bodies of information being transmitted by the genetic and linguistic codes respectively are complementary. Thus, for example, each individual human being is genetically coded to learn a language-any language-as a genus specific form of communication, and during the appropriate period of childhood will absorb a language like an eager sponge; but the language itself, of course, is part of the cultural information that the linguistic code transmits. The genetic mechanism seems to have relinquished to the linguistic mechanism, entirely or to a degree, other functions ordinarily inherited genetically in nonhuman species. Is a human being genetically geared to search for food when he is hungry, or to recognize what is edible? Does genetics alone provide him with urges specific enough to ensure propagation? The small amount of learned behavior among nonhuman species (Cassirer 1953b:44) . Cultural systems are those systems pervaded with symbolism, they are distinguished as those systems containing symbolizing components, organisms with the capacity to create, learn and use symbols who have actualized that capacity. Radin once remarked "it is universally admitted that symbolism permeates every aspect of primitive man's culture" (1954:29), a statement which can be generalized to all cultural systems both tribal and statal. Sapir expressed it well: "All culture is in fact heavily charged with symbolism" (1934: 494; see also Thurnwald 1937:199-200) .
All human nongenetic phenomena are not necessarily symbolic. Rather, symbolism--particularly in its most widely effective form, language-is required to maintain such nongenetic phenomena for human populations, allowing such phenomena to develop the varied and striking forms that they do. Consequently, wherever there is a species possessing the symbolizing faculty and utilizing it, the nongenetic phenomena associated with that species are for that reason distinguishable and may be called by a distinct name. Culture is the term we can employ with entire confidence, since there has always been the tendency to use it in this way. Moreover, wherever a species possesses the symbolizing faculty and utilizes it, the members of that species are caught up in total supra-individual systems that also may be given a distinctive name. "A culture" and, alternatively, "a cultural system" are the terms advocated here for this purpose in keeping with the naming procedures followed in other sciences: we name the system after its distinguishing character or content. In other words, it is the arbitrary nature of human communication that makes nonarbitrary our conceptual restriction of culture to mankind. Elsewhere in the universe there may exist other life forms, however bizarre by our standards, possessing and utilizing a symbolic faculty, to whom the term culture would necessarily apply. But for this planet of ours, to the best of anyone's knowledge, only one life form has evolved with that faculty and made use of it: man. As Folsom noted, "the human brain is the only known mechanism in all nature through which symbols can be produced" (1928:190) . "The human brain," asserted Herrick, "can fabricate symbols and abstractions; it can use language, numbers and equations, design machines, bridges, telescopes, and use them. The chimpanzee does not know the meaning of y2 = 2 px, and he never can find out" (1926:290; his italics).
This argument holds as long as no symbolic communication is discovered "in nature," i.e., outside of those total integrative systems in which human beings are found. By and large, nonhuman animal communication is genetically determined (i.e., nonarbitrary)-the preponderance of animal cries and posturing, the dancing of bees, etc.-or else noncommunicative mimicry-the "parroting" of parrots, porpoises, etc. What Wescott refers to when he asserts that "both fish and insects, not to mention birds and mammals, produce and respond to symbols" (1964:164) is unclear. Work with chimpanzees, however, is producing laboratory specimens capable of communicating symbolically in a simple but clear manner, even combining symbols to form message bearing constructs as in language (Hahn 1971 :80, 86-89). The symbolic faculty as such no longer appears to be a human monopoly. As Bryan recognized, "If the process of symbolization of abstract thoughts does occur in a rudimentary form among other animals, we must conclude that.. . the capacity for the construction of culture is . . only a difference in degree" (1963:301) . One crucial consideration, however, should not be overlooked: chimpanzees communicating symbolically are only to be found in already existing cultural systems with their human society nuclei. We have succeeded merely in extending a modicum of symbolic behavior from the human components of a cultural system to some of its nonhuman components. Chimpanzees in the wild have given no indication that they exercise the weak symbolic faculty which we can no longer deny that they possess. Special qualifications will have to be made regarding our conceptual restriction of culture to man on4y if these laboratory chimpanzees start communicating symbolically with each other and then make their escape to the wild. Until then, the phrase "human culture" for this planet must be taken as redundant. Experimentation and investigation continue in the area of animal communication, but as long as we can isolate some discernible difference between human and nonhuman communication, however minuscule or subtle, we can justify the conceptual limitation of culture to man so necessary to make sense of the indubitably unique nature of human accomplishment. Whenever we pick up a book, view a work of art, recite a poem, or inspect a temple, we should be aware that nothing comparable exists "in nature," that we are confronted with a difference not in quantity but in kind. "There is an immeasurable difference between the rudest man and the highest lower animal," wrote Tylor on one occasion, providing as justification for this assertion the observation that "to use words in themselves unmeaning, as symbols.. . is scarcely to be traced in any lower animal" ( In the light of what we have considered thus far, it is possible to set forth a consistent set of terms incorporating the word culture with definitions that clarify rather than obfuscate the reality and issues involved. Included in the list that follows are terms that do not contain the word culture. They are necessary, however, for defining the terms that do. The entire list is presented as a basic vocabulary for the realistic handling of cultural matters.
In terms of the definitions given, certain common manners of expression will have to be abandoned as meaningless or confused. Thus, if we accept the argument presented in this paper, it becomes meaningless to speak of two or more societies "having" or "sharing" the same culture. Such expression follows from the view that society and culture are mutually excthsive, a view which we have rejected. "Although we can say that each society has a culture," wrote Ina Brown, "it does not follow.., .that several different societies may not share, at least to a large extent, a common culture" (1963: Let us start, in true Aristotelian fashion, at the beginning:
(1) Anthropology: the study of the sum total of all human phenomena.
(2) Phenomenon: any particular observable thing, occurrence or property.
(3) Human phenomenon: any phenomenon that owes its existence to the mere existence of man (the genus Homo).
(4) Cultural anthropology: the study of the sum total of all human nongenetic phenomena.
(5) Human nongenetic phenomenon: a human phenomenon that is not a direct expression of genetic inheritance. It is here suggested that "trait" and "feature" be distinguished in the manner indicated and, further, that the phrase "cultural element" be used as a general term to refer indiscriminately to cultural phenomena and cultural traits or features whenever such a term is called for.
(10) A system: any observable existent consisting of discernible parts (or components) modified and organized in discernible ways to form an entity larger than themselves.
(11) A material system: a system whose components are material things.
(12) A culture, or cultural system: a material system consisting of a set of material components (human and nonhuman), a set of modifications (neural and physical), and a set of organizational relationships (social and technical). The sum total of these three sets of cultural phenomena is the total number of cultural phenomena in the cultural system at a given time. When these phenomena are classified, we derive the total number of culture traits present as features of that culture at that time. The human components must comprise a single human society, and the nonhuman components must be artifacts which they make and use (minus exports, plus imports). The biological analog of "a culture" or "a cultural system" is "an organism" or "an organic system," and not "species" as Murdock (1953:478) would have it.
(13) A society: for all nonhuman species, a group of organisms of the same species constituting a breeding population.
(14) A human society: a group of human organisms constituting a breeding population or a maximum political entity, whichever is greater in the given instance. In those cases where these two criteria coincide, where a single breeding population is controlled by a single political authority, the population is a human society. In those cases where, as is typical among foragers, a breeding population consists of several politically autonomous but intermarrying bands, it is the breeding population that constitutes the human society by this definition. In those cases where several breeding populations are under a single political authority, as in a caste situation or at least initially after conquest or confederation of several previously separate societies, it is the group of populations thus forming a maximum political entity that comprises the human society. The rationale for this approach is that a band, though politically autonomous, is not self-sustaining, since it does and must intermarry with other bands within the larger breeding population, which alone maintains itself down through the generations; conversely a caste, for example, is not selfgoverning and so has no independent existence apart from the sum total of all under the single political authority that does exist. In any event, the breeding populations and societies into which any species, human or nonhuman, is divided, are in a constant state of flux. The number of breeding populations or societies in a species changes over time as a result of fission, fusion and termination; size and boundaries also change constantly. A society, like a breeding population, is a "temporary isolate" of a species; it comes into existence through either fission or fusion and passes out of existence through either of these means or by termination (in the extreme, or "Tasmanian," case).
(15) A subsociety: a fraction or portion of a society distinguished on any grounds whatsoever-age, class, occupation, race, region, religion, sex, or any other-whether or not the subsociety is recognized by the members of the society itself. Once a basis is selected, for whatever investigatory reason, the entire society is to be divided into a number of subsocieties such that no one in the society is excluded. Although the concept is usually applied only to human societies, there might be reason for distinguishing subsocieties in nonhuman societies, depending on the purpose of the inquiry.
(16) A subculture: a fraction or portion of a culture, or cultural system, consisting of a subsociety and all other elements of the culture especially associated with that subsociety. Subcultures in any particular culture are not entirely distinguishable one from another, since whatever sets them apart merges gradually into whatever commonality binds them together. Subcultures are usually more prominent in the larger, more complex statal cultures than in tribal cultures. As Steward has noted, "The culture of a modem nation is not simply a behavioral norm ... Different groups of individuals are substantially dissimilar in many respects. They have subcultures" (1955: 46; see also Kroeber 1948:274). An error to be avoided is viewing or describing subcultures as distinct cultures. This error is related to that of describing several societies as "having the same culture," both undoubtedly stemming from a misguided view of many anthropologists that a culture must be something internally homogeneous, without regard to societal boundaries. Yet, while it is true that tribal cultures (with which anthropologists traditionally are best acquainted) tend to be internally homogeneous, statal cultures tend to be internally heterogeneous, a situation that should cause no difficulty whatever. The error we are considering finds expression in such statements as "there may be more than one culture in a single society, and a single culture can exist in more than one society" (Anon. On the contrary, in terms of our presentation, the answer to Clifton's question must be an indubitable "yes": the Indonesian cultural system today includes Western New Guinea, the former tribal cultures of which are now subcultures of the statal culture that has laid claim to their territory, at least to the extent that Indonesia does exercise political authority over them.
(17) Cultural component: any material thing, animate or inanimate, incorporated into a cultural system.
(18) Human component: a member of a given human society and consequently a component (material component) of the cultural system which has that society as its nucleus.
(19) Nonhuman component: an artifact in a given cultural system.
(20) Artifact: any material thing produced or modified by animal agency. This is to recognize that many nonhuman species produce artifacts: nests, hives, dams, etc.
(21) Cultural artifact: any material thing produced or modified by human agency. (25) Cultural modification: any modification imposed by the operation of a cultural system upon suitable "raw material" to transform that material into a properly modified component of that culture, looking and behaving as such a component should. Cultural modifications are impressed upon all components, both human and nonhuman, the "raw material" in the former case being the puling baby or, more accurately, the zygote (compare Beals and Hoijer 1965:252; Warden 1936:6). Any particular cultural component, then, consists of two fractions: one fraction is the raw material, drawn from outside the cultural system or generated within it, from which the component is fashioned; the other fraction is the sum of the cultural modifications imposed upon that raw material.
(26) Physical modification: a cultural modification involving a change in form or chemistry of the component in question. A ceramic pot is a good example of both kinds of physical modification. To make a pot it is first necessary to obtain suitable clay which serves as the raw material from which the pot will be fashioned. After suitable preparation, the clay must be given the shape of a pot, this being a physical modification of form; and then fired, this being a physical modification of chemistry. Only then is it a pot component in a culture, looking and behaving as a pot should. Without the presence in the culture of the particular cultural modifications involved here, there could be no pot, only clay. In the words of Confucius, "If an urn lacks the characteristics of an urn, how can we call it an urn?" (1955:48) . Most physical modifications are imposed on the nonhuman components of cultural systems. Nevertheless, in every cultural system the human components are also invariably found to be physically modified so that they will look, and even behave, as human components of that culture should. Physical modifications of human com- Regarding the distributional frequencies of the traits in a society's associated corporate heritage, we find a useful application of Linton's well-known typology of universals, alternatives, specialties, and idiosyncrasies (1936:272-274). A Lintonian universal would be a trait found among the members of a given society with a frequency of 100%. At the other extreme would be a Lintonian idiosyncrasy, with a frequency of 1/n X 100% (n = the number of individuals in the society). Between these two extremes we should find Lintonian alternatives and specialties, with frequencies in the range 100 > x% > 1/n X 100, i.e., less than 100% (35) Culture area, or cultural area: an area or region encompassing a group of cultures, usually contiguous, which share a set of traits that distinguish them from the cultures in other such areas; also, the group of cultures within such an area. On occasion, within a culture area, we encounter smaller groupings of very similar cultures; these smaller groupings may appropriately be called "culture clusters" (Murdock 1953:478 ). An important understanding to be established in this connection is that a culture area or a culture cluster is not a culture-it is not a single cultural system but a group of such systems. It is therefore incorrect to say, in the manner that Mandelbaum misquoted Lowie, that "western Europe as a whole presents a continuum--one culture and with admittedly innumerable local variations" (Mandelbaum 1956 :217-218; see also Kroeber 1948:254, 281, 587 If it thus appears absurd to speak of a culture area or culture cluster as a culture, the height of absurdity is reached when it is claimed that there exists in the world only a single world-wide cultural system. A world culture or a world cultural system is as meaningless a concept as that of a world organism. Cultures do interact, and they do interchange artifacts and even human components, but they remain distinguishable as discrete entities, if the procedure for identifying them suggested here is followed. They do not merge into a single cultural system. The notion of a single world culture had its origin in a passage written by Lowie, that "a culture is invariably an artificial unit segregated for purposes of expediency It would be equally legitimate to apply the term "culture type" to the categories produced by crosscutting major types of environment with levels of political integration, as proposed by Steward (1955: 92; see also Steward and Faron 1959:12-13). A "culture type" is necessarily a part of a typology of cultural systems, and any given typology is constructed to aid in solving or clarifying a particular set of scientific problems. We can expect to develop different typologies for different problems and purposes, some more important than others. A master typology does not yet number among anthropology's accomplishments, and considerable truth remains in Radcliffe-Brown's judgment that "we have hardly taken the first steps toward a scientific classification" of cultures (1957:33) . It is important to establish in this connection that a culture type is not a culture-it is not a particular cultural system but a category of such systems. Over time, a particular culture can change its type, i.e., its classification in any given typology, through the normal processes of change (compare Radcliffe- Brown 1952 Brown :181, 1957 . In changing its type, a culture remains identifiable as the same culture-it does not become another culture. With regard to culture change, a distinction can be made between entity change and compositional change. An entity change is the change of an entire culture resulting from fission, fusion, termination, or migration (locale change). A culture ceases to exist as a result of the first three of these processes; one or more other cultures come into existence as a result of the first two of these selfsame processes. Compositional change is, by contrast, a change in the features present in any given culture, as a result of simple gain, simple loss, replacement, or transformation of one or more features. Compositional change can result in a change of type, but the culture remains the same cultural entity, whatever internal changes it may have undergone. When we are talking only about compositional change, or a change of type, it is an error to say that "culture A of one time period becomes culture B of a later period" (Anon. 1971:205). It is still culture A, but is now perhaps of type II whereas formerly it had been of type I in terms of some typological scheme.
It is possible to proceed further with the analysis of cultural components, modifications and organization, and with the consideration of cultural stability and change, but enough has been accomplished in this initial essay.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate how it is possible to make the culture concept clear and distinct in such a way as to dispense with the criticisms that have been leveled at it, and also to avoid the trivialization of the concept that comes from considering society and culture mutually exclusive. Acceptance of the argument presented here will determine whether or not that purpose has been accomplished. Terms -some new, many familiar-have been given precise definitions intended to exclude any ambiguity and to supersede previous formulations.
Acceptance of the definitions provided herein should rest on three considerations. First, the terms as defined should prove to be precisely applicable to the reality which we are studying, such that distinguishable entities are named and their relations to each other specified. Second, the set of defini-tions should prove to be internally consistent such that the terms do not come into semantic conflict with each other and one can pass from one to another of the concepts in a logical and orderly manner. These two conditions, in my belief, are met by this presentation. Third, the terms as defined should prove productive, in a way that other terminology and other definitions do not, in the building of sound theory and in the disclosure of hitherto unrecognized areas of theoretical import. We have had enough of definition for its own sake. Kroeber and Kluckhohn admitted as much in the following passage: "As yet we have no full theory of culture. We have a fairly well-delineated concept [but] ... concepts have a way of coming to a dead end unless they are bound together in a testable theory. In anthropology at present we have plenty of definitions but too little theory" (1952:181) . Two theoretical questions of some interest might be taken as a first test of whether this third condition is met, and will be explored in subsequent articles: the place of cultural systems among the material systems of the physical universe, and the nature of cultural systems viewed as parasitic systems relying on environmental resources for their continued existence. . Conversely, we have in language the occasional occurrence of onomatopoeia. The practical solution to the problem raised by Saussure is to recognize that the distinguishing characteristic of symbols is that they need not have a "natural connection" with what they signify. 4 In an earlier attempt to make sense out of existing terminology, Morris suggested that symbols be taken as a subcategory of signs; he deviated from the argument pre-
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